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Hester Prynne, Lydia Bennet, and Section 306 Stock:
The Concept of Tainting in the American Novel, the British Novel,
And the Internal Revenue Code
By Stephen B. Cohen1
5 Green Bag 2d 5 (2001)
I need to solve a literary-legal mystery: Did Nathaniel
Hawthorne’s novel, The Scarlet Letter, inspire Section 306 of the
Internal Revenue Code?  The need is urgent.  With each passing
day, Section 306 becomes increasingly irrelevant.  If an answer does
not appear soon, literary theorists and tax lawyers may lose interest,
and an insight into American culture may be lost.
Section 306 adopts a peculiarly Hawthorne-like solution to a tax
avoidance scheme known as the “preferred stock bailout.”  In 1953
the Sixth Circuit, surprisingly, blessed the preferred stock bailout in
the case of Chamberlin v. Commissioner.3  One year later, Congress
enacted Section 306 to reverse the Sixth Circuit’s decision.  The facts
of the preferred stock bailout scheme in Chamberlin are as follows.
                                                
1 Stephen B. Cohen is Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center
2 I.R.C. § 306 (c).
3 207 F. 2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 918 (1954).
C.P. Chamberlin and his wife, Grace, owned nearly 85 percent
of the common stock of the Metal Moulding Corporation (MMC),
located in Detroit, Michigan.  MMC, which began operations in 1924,
sold bright metallic trim to the producers of American automobiles.
With the end of World War II, American auto manufacturers shifted
their production from war materials to consumer goods.  There was
tremendous pent-up consumer demand for cars and virtually no
competition from foreign manufacturers.  Automobiles of that period,
as older readers may recall, were garishly adorned with large
amounts of metallic trim of the type produced by MMC.
Thus, after World War II, MMC began to earn enormous profits.
In the year 1946 alone, the company’s accumulated profits increased
by 47 percent over the total for the previous 21 years of its operating
history.4
These large profits created a tax problem for Mr. and Mrs.
Chamberlin, MMC’s largest stockholders.  The Chamberlins wanted
MMC to distribute its after-tax corporate profits.  However, the Tax
Code decreed, then as now, that distributed corporate earnings are
dividends and that a shareholder who receives dividends pays tax on
the entire amount at ordinary income rates.  For the 16 years after
World War II, the top ordinary income tax rate (to which the
Chamberlins were probably subject, given MMC’s prosperity) was an
all-but-confiscatory 90 percent.5
Therefore, the Chamberlins devised the following three-step
transaction.  In the first prearranged step, they caused the
corporation to distribute to its common stockholders a dividend
consisting not of cash but of newly issued shares of the corporation’s
own nonvoting preferred stock.  In the second prearranged step, the
shareholders sold their preferred stock to two insurance companies
for about $800,000.  Finally, in the third prearranged step of the plan,
stretching over seven years, the corporation itself redeemed the
entire issue of preferred stock, buying it back from the insurance
companies for $800,000.
What tax treatment did the Chamberlins claim?  On the first
step, the distribution of the preferred stock dividend, they claimed
nonrecognition.  For this position they had solid authority:  The
Supreme Court had repeatedly held that such stock dividends, unlike
distributions of cash, are mere paper transactions and therefore merit
                                                                                                                                                
4 By the end of 1945, the total of accumulated after-tax profits was $1,425,000.  During 1946, accumulated
nonrecognition.6   Moreover, Congress had acceded to the Court’s
judgment and amended the Internal Revenue Code to provide tax-
free treatment for stock dividends distributed pro rata on common
stock.7
As for the second step of the transaction, the sale of their new
preferred stock to the insurance companies for $800,000, the
Chamberlins argued that they should be taxed like any other seller of
property.  Therefore their income was not the entire $800,000 but
only the amount by which the sales price exceeded their basis in the
stock.8  Moreover, this income was taxable only at the capital gains
rate, at the time 25 percent, much lower than the top 90 percent rate
for ordinary income.9
Finally the Chamberlins stated that the third step of the
transaction, the corporation’s redemption of its stock from the
insurance companies, did not involve them at all and therefore should
have no effect on their tax treatment.
                                                                                                                                                
after-tax profits rose by an additional $665,000.
5 B. Bittker & L. Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates, and Gifts, page 1-13 (3rd ed. 1999).
6 Towne v. Eisner, 425 U.S. 418 (1918); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); Helvering v. Griffiths,
318 U.S. 371 (1943); Helvering v. Sprouse, 318 U.S. 604 (1943); Strassburger v. Comm’r, 318 U.S. 604
(1943).
7 Under current law, I.R.C. § 305(a) provides for tax-free treatment of stock dividends—subject, however,
to numerous exceptions.
8 Under current law, I.R.C. § 307(a) provides that the basis of the original common stock is allocated
between the original common stock and the preferred stock that is received as a tax-free dividend.
9 Bittker & Lokken, supra , n. 3.
Nevertheless, the net effect of all three steps taken together
was economically indistinguishable from a distribution by MMC to its
shareholders of an $800,000 cash dividend, which would have been
taxed to them in full as ordinary income.  After completion of the
entire three-step transaction, the Chamberlins still owned nearly 85
percent of MMC’s equity, which, as before the transaction started,
consisted entirely of common stock.  The only changes at the end of
the three-step transaction were that MMC had $800,000 less cash,
and the Chamberlins and other common stockholders had $800,000
more cash.  The insurance companies, for their part, appeared to
serve as a mere conduit for disguising a cash dividend distribution
from MMC as a sale to an outside party.  The Chamberlins had used
preferred stock to distribute, or “bail out,” corporate profits at capital
gains rather than ordinary income rates.  Hence tax lawyers
described the scheme as a “preferred stock bailout.”
The Chamberlins’ case went to the Tax Court, which showed
no reluctance in holding that the Chamberlins had effectively received
a cash dividend and should be taxed accordingly.10  Yet on appeal
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the Sixth Circuit reversed.  What might explain the Court of Appeals’
extraordinary decision?
One factor was that the Chamberlins, who had competent but
undistinguished Detroit counsel in the Tax Court, retained new
attorneys for the appeal to the Sixth Circuit.  In an inspired move, the
Chamberlins hired Randolph Paul and Louis Eisenstein of
Washington, D.C., considered the two most accomplished tax
attorneys in the nation.  It must have been especially difficult for the
Internal Revenue Service to litigate against Randolph Paul, co-author
of the standard treatise on federal income taxation,11 which judges
routinely consulted in difficult tax cases.12
In addition, the IRS weakened its case by making a much
broader argument than it needed to win.  The Service might have
argued simply that the effect of all three steps of the Chamberlin
transaction was equivalent to a cash dividend.  On two previous
occasions, the Supreme Court had already decided that if formally
                                                
11 Randolph E. Paul & Jacob Mertens, Jr., The Law of Federal Income Taxation (1935).
12 Judge Jerome Frank, the distinguished Second Circuit jurist, referred to Randolph Paul as “our most
eminent tax commentator.”  Harry J. Rudick, Randolph E. Paul, 11 Tax L. Rev. 201 (1956).
separate steps, like the three steps in Chamberlin, have the effect of
a dividend, they should be taxed as a dividend.13
However, the IRS added that it was the distribution of the
preferred stock in step one of the transaction that should be treated
as producing a taxable dividend.  By refusing to concede that the
distribution of the preferred stock dividend should be tax-free, the
Service was attacking a long-established principle, explicitly approved
by both the Supreme Court and Congress.
The Service’s “step one” argument thereby provided Randloph
Paul and Louis Eisenstein with a delectable target.  Asking the Sixth
Circuit to reverse, they wrote,
The issue in this case is easily stated.  May the
[IRS] zealously disregard the network of rules so carefully
devised by Congress, the courts, and itself because it
would now write them differently if it were free to do so?
The [IRS] tacitly assumes that [it] enjoys this sweeping
power to determine fiscal policy. . . .  We respectfully
submit that the [IRS] has wandered well beyond the
relevant statutes and disingenuously improvised a tax
policy of its own . . . .
The Tax Court, in the fashion of the [IRS], has
called upon some brooding “spirit” that is neither
expressed nor restrained by any words that Congress has
ever used.  Since the opinion is untrammeled by any
statute, it is vagrant and unconfined.  Inevitably, it leads
                                                
13 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Bazley v. Comm’r, 331 U.S. 737, rehearing denied and prior
op. amended, 332 U.S. 752 (1947).  Both opinions emphasized that the taxpayer’s predominant motive was
tax avoidance, as was also the case in Chamberlin.
into a quagmire of confusion where any intelligible
principles of law sink and disappear.  Whatever rule the
Tax Court’s opinion may attempt to state is no rule at all.
The opinion is a standing invitation to chaos in the
taxation of stock dividends—a chaos [that] a proper
deference to Congress would refuse to attribute to that
body.14
The Sixth Circuit, however, went too far in ignoring the
connections among the steps in the Chamberlin transaction.  In
refusing to treat the entire transaction as a dividend, the Sixth Circuit
emphasized that seven years elapsed between the sale of the
preferred stock to the insurance companies and the complete
redemption of the preferred from the insurance companies by MMC.
[I]n the absence of a finding that it was immediately or
shortly thereafter redeemed . . . , we assume that a large
portion of [the preferred stock] has remained outstanding
over a period of years with some of its still unredeemed
after nearly seven years.15
However, contrary to the court’s assumption, the fact that the
preferred stock was outstanding for up to seven years seems
irrelevant.  The corporation had committed itself to redeem the
preferred at a definite price and according to a fixed schedule.  The
preferred stock benefited from numerous protective provisions,
including the requirement of a sinking fund to guarantee that MMC
                                                
14 Brief for Petitioners, Chamberlin v. Comm’r, supra, quoted in M. Carr Ferguson, The Legacy of Louis
would have enough cash to fulfill its redemption commitment.  Thus,
at the moment when the Chamberlins made their sale to the
insurance companies in step two, it was nearly certain that MMC
would redeem the preferred stock in step three.  Indeed, had there
actually been a substantial risk of nonredemption, state prudent
investor laws would probably have prohibited the insurance
companies from purchasing the MMC preferred stock in the first
place.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in favor of the taxpayers in
Chamberlin raised an ominous possibility.  The court had provided a
roadmap for shareholders of close corporations who wished to cash
out corporate profits while avoiding taxation at ordinary income rates.
Instead of taking out such profits through cash dividend distributions,
shareholders would simply employ preferred stock bailouts.  Closely
held corporations might stop paying regular cash dividends
altogether.
Congress responded to this danger with Section 306, which
artfully avoids the weaknesses of the IRS’s position in Chamberlin.
Section 306 does not tax the distribution of preferred stock as a
                                                                                                                                                
Eisenstein, 22 Tax L. Rev. 7, 9-10 (1966).
dividend, the result advocated without success by the IRS in
Chamberlin.  Instead, Section 306 accepts the principle that a
distribution of preferred stock on common shares should be tax-free.
What Section 306 does instead of challenging this principle is to taint
the preferred stock.
Section 306 labels the preferred stock as “Section 306 stock.”16
Special rules then govern the subsequent disposition of this tainted
stock.  If it is sold, the usual rules governing stock sales, including
recovery of basis and capital gains treatment, do not apply.  Instead,
the sale proceeds are in effect taxed as if a cash dividend had been
paid.17  Thus, Section 306  attacks the Chamberlin transaction at
“step two,” treating the sale proceeds as if they had been cash
dividends received from the corporation.
There are exceptions to the special disposition rules if the sale
of Section 306 stock does not constitute a bailout.  For example, if a
taxpayer sells his entire equity interest in a corporation, including both
306 and non-306 stock, then the special disposition rules do not
apply.18  Nor should they, because the shareholder could have sold
                                                                                                                                                
15 Chamberlin, 207 F. 2d at 471.
16 I.R.C. § 306 (c).
17 I.R.C. § 306(a)(1)(A).
18 I.R.C. § 306(b)(1)(A).
his entire stock interest before the distribution of Section 306 stock
and received sales treatment, including recovery of basis and the
benefit of lower capital gains rates.  
Section 306, with its concept of a taint that can dog a stock
from acquisition to dispositon, seems designed by a novelist rather
than a tax technician.  So I called a friend who teaches English at a
major university and asked specifically: Did Nathaniel Hawthorne’s
The Scarlet Letter inspire Section 306?  Here is a more-or-less
verbatim transcript of our conversation.
I said, “Section 306 of the Internal Revenue Code was enacted
to prevent tax avoidance.  If taxpayers acquire stock suitable for tax
avoidance, Section 306 taints the stock and applies special rules to
the stock’s disposition.  This tainting of stock is like the tainting of
Nathaniel Hawthorne’s heroine, Hester Prynne, who had to wear a
scarlet A.  The comparison seems too close to be just coincidence.
What do you think?”
She said, “My field is the nineteenth-century British novel.  I
barely remember The Scarlet Letter.  I haven’t read it since junior
high school.”
I pressed on: “All right; in the nineteenth-century British novel,
is there a similar concept of tainting?”
She said, “It doesn’t apply.  In the nineteenth-century British
novel, you are either in or you are out.”
I said, “What do you mean?”
She said, “For example, take Jane Austen’s Pride and
Prejudice.  Lydia Bennet runs off with Mr. Wickham.  They have an
affair.  But her family rushes in and quickly arranges a marriage.
That is the only way she can remain in the novel.  If the family had
not been able to arrange the marriage, Lydia would have been
dropped from the novel altogether.  You see?  In the nineteenth
century British novel, there is no concept of tainting.  Either you’re in
or you’re out.”
“So,” I said, “in the nineteenth-century British novel, tainting is
not an acceptable option.”
She said, “Right.  Either your existence is fully acknowledged or
it is not acknowledged at all.  Not like Hester Prynne in The Scarlet
Letter, who was tainted or half-acknowledged.”
What my friend said about Jane Austen applies to the Internal
Revenue Code as well.  Usually an asset is either a capital asset,
whose disposition produces a favored capital gain, or it’s not.  But
306 stock, like Hester Prynne, has an ambiguous status.  If the
stockholder attempts to use the stock to achieve a bailout, ordinary
dividend taxation results.  But if the owner, in an act of renunciation,
sells his entire equity interest, the preferred stock is cleansed of its
Section 306 taint.
Today, Section 306 is being overtaken by changes in the tax
law.  The Code was recently amended to treat certain pro rata
distributions of preferred stock as taxable dividends rather than
accord tax-free treatment.19  More fundamentally, closely held
businesses increasingly elect to be taxed not under the classic two-
level corporation-shareholder tax system but instead as partnerships.
Under the partnership model, business income is taxed directly to the
partners whether it is distributed or accumulated.20  The Internal
Revenue Code, like the nineteenth century British novel, appears
increasingly uncomfortable with the studied ambiguity that Section
306 and Hester Prynne represent.
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